

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Director

DATE: 27 July 1948

FROM : Assistant Director, OCD

SUBJECT: CIA's Inability to Obtain Adequate Flow of Vital Intelligence Information from the Army.

1. The Agency is suffering seriously from the lack of effective day-to-day liaison with the offices in the Army which control the flow of cables.

2. Intelligence Division is the barrier. Basing its attitude on Army Circular #64, ID holds that CIA may have no direct contact with other offices of the Army, on the ground that ID controls all intelligence matters for the Army and that CIA has no rightful concern with any Army matters except foreign intelligence.

3. ID's thesis, as stated above, is sound. In practice, however, it places tremendous difficulties in the way of CIA. Army cables dealing with operational matters are often of no direct concern to ID, but of vital importance to CIA in making national intelligence estimates. Such cables in some instances are not received by ID, in other cases they are received by ID but withheld from CIA on the ground that they are "operational" or "departmental" in nature, and hence unsuited for transmission to CIA.

4. The supply of Berlin by air lift is a case in point. This is an operational problem, as judged by ID, and CIA has received only fragmentary and spasmodic information on (1) the food and coal requirements of the Western Sectors, and (2) the food and coal deliveries by air lift. CIA's Liaison Officer, [ ] finally succeeded through informal channels in determining where the information was coming in to the Army. With this information in hand, he then succeeded in getting ID to obtain and transmit the data needed. [ ] deserves great credit for this exploit, but it is one strictly contrary to ID's desires. Had he complied with ID's rulebook he would never have found out where the information was coming in to the Army, and would never therefore have gotten effective results from ID.

5. Unfortunately it is not possible for me to give you an exact statement, listing specific cables and documents, of the vitally important information withheld from CIA by ID. When we learn of a specific cable or document, and make a specific request for it, we generally get it. The great difficulty is that we learn of such cables or documents only by accident and indirectly. No one from CIA has access to the Secretariat, or its Staff Communications Office, and this is probably the only single place in the Army where CIA might be able to get the information it requires.

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6. It should be noticed in passing that an analagous situation obtains in the State Department. In spite of the objections of OIR, CIA has liaison through its Current Intelligence Group with the Secretary's Office, and it is through this channel that an important part of the material in the Daily Summary is obtained. If this channel were closed, CIA's Daily Summary would be disastrously affected.

7. Attempts to deal with the Army problem through ICAPS have proved wholly ineffective. After making several visits to the Pentagon, [ ] recommends that CIA continue to placate ID by dealing with no one in the Army save through ID and in the company of an officer of ID. We know from long experience that this is an utterly fruitless recommendation.

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8. It is believed that General Vandenberg once approached General Eisenhower on this problem, and that he succeeded in arranging for occasional deliveries of "Eyes Only" information from the Army to your office. I do not know whether this arrangement still holds, but it is certain in any event that such materials do not go to ORE where they are urgently needed.

9. In the event of hostilities, nearly all Army cable traffic will come under the heading of "operational", and CIA will be unable to produce current intelligence of any value whatsoever.

10. It is respectfully recommended that steps be taken by the Director's office to place [ ] for at least one-half of each working day in the Army's Secretariat, or in the Staff Communications Office of the Secretariat, with access to all incoming Army cable traffic and authority to recommend transmission of appropriate information to CIA. If this can be achieved, and it can be achieved if at all only by a direct approach to the Chief of Staff or Deputy Chief of Staff, we would gain the following advantages:

a. CIA would have effective top-level liaison with the Army.

b. Whether or not CIA obtained from the Army all the information requested by [ ] on the Agency's behalf, the Director would at least benefit by [ ] knowledge of current thinking in the Army's highest echelons.

c. At least some of the information requested by [ ] would probably come to us, probably with specific "Eyes Only" restrictions, for use by ORE in preparing the Daily Summary, just as we now receive similar material under similar restrictions from the Secretary of State.

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d. A considerable amount of traffic which now is received by Plans and Operations Division, GSUSA, and probably by other Divisions, would be made known to CIA and could very likely be made available on a routine delivery basis. We would at least learn whether or not Army was receiving particular types of needed information, and what steps we should take to gain access to it.



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JAMES M. ANDREWS

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Concurrence:

Assistant Director  
Office of Reports and Estimates

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Executive Director	<i>Q</i>	<i>28 July</i>
2	Director	<i>RMS</i>	
3			
4			
5			

  

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Asst Director O.C.D.	<i>hst</i>	<i>27/11/48</i>
2			
3			

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REMARKS: *I believe this lies in with our communication problem of insuring that we have all info at all times - Q*

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